Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process Rights in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System by Ikpa, Tina S.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 24 Following Marriage 
January 2007 
Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process Rights 
in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
Tina S. Ikpa 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tina S. Ikpa, Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process Rights in Order to Reform the 
Criminal Justice System, 24 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 301 (2007), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
301 
Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due 
Process Rights in Order to Reform the Criminal 
Justice System 
Tina S. Ikpa* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Restorative justice is a phrase that is known only in small, 
concentrated pockets of the United States and other parts of the 
world. It is well known in alternative dispute resolution circles and in 
juvenile courts.1 For a growing number of legal scholars, it is a 
source of study and debate.2 To the general American public and a 
large part of the legal world, however, it is still an enigma. 
Restorative justice is not easily defined,3 which is why efforts to 
educate the public about it and its benefits require strategic planning.4 
Howard Zehr, one of the premier scholars of restorative justice, has 
offered one definition: “Restorative justice is a process to involve, to 
the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and 
to collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in 
 
 * J.D. 2007, Washington University School of Law. The author wishes to express her 
appreciation to her husband, Nsisong, for his enduring love and support; to Nina Balsam for her 
tireless efforts in advancing the cause of restorative justice; and to the editorial staff of the 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy.  
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 3. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 36 (2002). Zehr states: 
“Even though there is general agreement on the basic outlines of restorative justice, those in the 
field have been unable to come to a consensus on its specific meaning.” Id. 
 4. The Missouri Coalition for Restorative Justice is geared toward increasing public 
awareness of restorative justice in eastern Missouri. Center for Women in Transition, Programs 
& Services, http://www.cwitstl.org/programs_services/restorative_justice.html (last visited June 
11, 2007). Organizations like this exist in other states as well. See, e.g., Restorative Justice 
Online, http://www.restorativejustice.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (follow “RJ Around the 
World” hyperlink); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Online Restorative Justice Notebook, http://www.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/nij/rest-just/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
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order to heal and put things as right as possible.”5 In order for that 
definition to provide any illumination on the subject it is necessary to 
understand the underlying principles of restorative justice. The many 
implications and nuances of restorative justice are complex,6 but 
Zehr’s attempted explanation is a first step toward framing the values 
that govern restorative justice. 
Restorative justice has a place in all forms of human interaction 
in which people feel as though they have been wronged, but this 
Note is concerned with criminal justice. Restorative justice is needed 
in the United States today because restorative justice is not the 
normal course of action in America.7 While it is most certainly not a 
panacea for all that ails the current criminal justice system,8 there is 
 
 5. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 37. Erik Luna presents four different definitions that have been 
proffered by scholars: 
 Restorative justice is a process of bringing together the individuals who have been 
affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by the 
crime. The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore communities in 
a way that all stakeholders can agree is just. 
 Restorative justice is concerned with the broader relationships between offenders, 
victims, and communities. All parties are involved in the process of settling the offense 
and reconciliation. . . . [T]he key focus [of the crime] is on the damage and injury done 
to victims and communities and each is seen as having a role to play in responding to 
the criminal act. . . . 
 Restorative justice is a process that brings victims and offenders together to face 
each other, to inform each other about their crimes and victimization, to learn about 
each others’ backgrounds, and to collectively reach agreement on a “penalty” or 
“restorative justice sanction.” Restorative justice returns the criminal conflict back to 
the victims and offenders. It empowers them to address sanctioning concerns together. 
 Crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligations to make things 
right. [Restorative] justice involves the victim, the offender, and the community in 
search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance. 
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 
2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 228 (third alteration in original). 
 6. See ZEHR, supra note 3, at 36. Zehr discusses the concerns restorative justice 
advocates have with penning one specific definition: “Some of us question the wisdom or 
usefulness of such a definition. While we recognize the need for principles and benchmarks, we 
worry about the arrogance and finality of establishing a rigid meaning.” Id. 
 7. In everyday human interaction, the common response when one person has wronged 
another is for the one who committed the wrong to acknowledge his or her wrongdoing, 
apologize, and seek to make it right with the person who was wronged. However, when 
criminal, and even civil, liability becomes a part of the equation, such acknowledgment could 
have serious legal repercussions. See discussion infra note 44.  
 8. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 12 (“Restorative justice is by no means an answer to all 
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essentially something for everyone along the path of restorative 
justice.9 
Victims have the chance to see their offenders, to tell them what 
effect the offense has had on the victim’s well-being, to receive an 
apology for what has happened, and to exact some kind of reparation 
for the harm that they have suffered.10 In addition to victims, 
 
situations. Nor is it clear that it should replace the legal system, even in an ideal world.”). Zehr 
describes the limits of the concept of restorative justice. Id. at 8–13. He explains that 
“[r]estorative justice is not primarily about forgiveness or reconciliation[,] . . . mediation[,] . . . 
designed to reduce recidivism or repeating offenses[,] . . . a particular program or a 
blueprint[,] . . . intended for comparatively minor offenses or for first-time offenders[,] . . . a 
new or North American development[,] . . . necessarily an alternative to prison[,] . . . [or] 
necessarily the opposite of retribution.” Id. at 8–13. Given such restrictions on the concept of 
restorative justice, it is easy to see why there is no one definition for it. Instead, talking about 
restorative justice means explaining its principles along with clarifying what it is not. 
 9. Restorative justice is most commonly touted as a victims’ rights philosophy. See Joan 
W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A Restorative Justice Critique of Anti-Gang 
Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 720 (2000) (“[R]estorative justice 
is the most hopeful, least cynical, and least co-opted aspect of the victims’ right [sic] 
movement.”). While the traditional justice system rarely takes into account the impact on or the 
needs of the victim, restorative justice gives the victim an essential role in the resolution of the 
problem. See Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice and International Human Rights, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 17, 24 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson 
eds., 1996); Nancy Lucas, Note, Restitution, Rehabilitation, Prevention, and Transformation: 
Victim-Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-Violent Youthful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1365, 1382–83 (2001) (“There has been an increasing realization that, in handing over 
their disputes to the state, victims have been left out of the process. . . . Ultimately, victim-
offender mediation gives victims a greater sense of control over circumstances that ordinarily 
would leave them feeling powerless and vulnerable.”); see also ZEHR, supra note 3, at 14–15 
(identifying the four classes of victims’ needs that the criminal justice system neglects: 
“information,” “truth-telling,” “empowerment,” and “restitution or vindication”). 
 10. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 14–15. Zehr details the importance for victims of telling one’s 
story:  
An important element in healing or transcending the experience of crime is an 
opportunity to tell the story of what happened. Indeed, it is often important for a victim 
to be able to retell this many times. . . . [I]t is important for victims to tell their stories 
to the ones who caused the harm and to have them understand the impact of their 
actions. 
Id. For victims, as Zehr asserts, apologies supply a basic need: “Apology may . . . contribute to 
[the] need to have one’s harm recognized.” Id. at 15. The gains for victims from receiving some 
kind of reparation can be two-fold:  
Restitution by offenders is often important to victims, sometimes because of the actual 
losses, but just as importantly, because of the symbolic recognition restitution implies. 
When an offender makes an effort to make right the harm, even if only partially, it is a 
way of saying “I am taking responsibility, and you are not to blame.” 
Id. 
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communities also benefit from restorative justice. It increases safety 
and helps members of the community (including family members of 
both the offender and the victim, friends, neighbors, and merely 
interested people within the community where the offense took 
place) feel as if they have control over their surroundings.11 Finally, 
the benefits are available to offenders as well. Restorative justice 
recognizes that offenders also have needs that are not adequately 
served by the criminal justice system.12 These are just a few of the 
benefits of restorative justice.13 
 
 11. Members of the community serve a binary role. As indirect victims of crime, 
community members are even more left out of the criminal justice process than direct victims. 
ZEHR, supra note 3, at 17. Zehr writes that “[c]ommunities . . . should be considered 
stakeholders as secondary victims.” Id.; see Luna, supra note 5, at 230 (when an offender 
commits a crime, “[t]he offender has also violated the relationship he has with the community 
at large, undermining the sense of security held by community members when leading their 
daily lives.”). As protectors of peace, the community can help facilitate healing for both the 
victim and the offender by assessing and attending to the needs of both parties. See ZEHR, supra 
note 3, at 18 (“Communities need from justice: . . . [e]ncouragement to take on their obligations 
for the welfare of their members, including victims and offenders, and to foster the conditions 
that promote healthy communities.”). 
 12. Id. at 16–17. Zehr lists four categories of needs that restorative justice addresses: 
Offenders need from justice:  
1. Accountability that  
• addresses the resulting harms,  
• encourages empathy and responsibility,  
• and transforms shame.  
2. Encouragement to experience personal transformation, including  
• healing for the harms that contributed to their offending behavior, 
• opportunities for treatment for addictions and/or other problems,  
• [and] enhancement of personal competencies.  
3. Encouragement and support for integration into the community.  
4. For some, at least temporary restraint.  
Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted). 
 Accountability is lacking in the criminal justice system, where “[o]ffenders are discouraged 
from acknowledging their responsibility and are given little opportunity to act on this 
responsibility in concrete ways.” Id. at 16. The criminal justice paradigm of punishment ignores 
real accountability and the benefits that come from it. Id. Zehr explains how restorative justice 
picks up where retributive justice stops: “Restorative justice has brought an awareness of the 
limits and negative byproducts of punishment. Beyond that, however, it has argued that 
punishment is not real accountability. Real accountability involves facing up to what one has 
done.” Id.; see Lucas, supra note 9, at 1371 (“[R]estorative justice inherently builds on an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/11
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If everything about restorative justice was beneficial, legal 
scholars and criminal justice practitioners would probably be 
spending less time writing about it and more time implementing it. 
However, restorative justice has its critics, and among their criticisms 
is the fear that restorative justice will run roughshod over offenders’ 
constitutional rights.14 
 
offender’s positive qualities and abilities, rather than only on his offense, and enhances offender 
accountability and an understanding of the consequences of criminal behavior.”).  
 Aside from accountability, restorative justice provides for other needs of offenders. 
Criminal justice rarely takes into account what might be driving an offender to commit the 
actions he does, and even when it is taken into account it merely serves as a defense against 
accountability of the offender. Examples include the extreme emotional disturbance and 
insanity defenses. Restorative justice recognizes the need to help the offender heal from any 
harms that might have “contributed to their offending behavior.” ZEHR, supra note 3, at 17. The 
understanding and healing of personal harms is one piece of the greater need of personal 
transformation. Id. Other elements of that need include “opportunities for treatment for 
addictions and/or other problems” and “enhancement of personal competencies.” Id. 
 13. The benefits of restorative justice are numerous. One benefit in particular that scholars 
have observed about restorative justice is its ability to reduce recidivism. See Lucas, supra note 
9, at 1375 (“Assessments of [victim-offender mediation] programs reveal that juvenile 
offenders who go through the mediation process tend to commit fewer and less serious crimes 
than offenders who are dealt with through standard procedures.”); see also Brenda Sims 
Blackwell & Clark D. Cunningham, Taking the Punishment Out of the Process: From 
Substantive Criminal Justice Through Procedural Justice to Restorative Justice, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 59, 83 (discussing the Georgia Justice Project and its role 
in reducing recidivism over a period of four years); William R. Nugent et al., Participation in 
Victim-Offender Mediation Reduces Recidivism, VOMA CONNECTIONS, Summer 1999, at 1, 1, 
available at http://www.voma.org/docs/connect3.pdf (summarizing findings from the 
evaluation of four studies that show a reduction in recidivism rates for juvenile offenders who 
participate in victim-offender mediation); DONALD J. SCHMID, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN NEW 
ZEALAND: A MODEL FOR U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34 (2001), available at http://www.fulbright. 
org.nz/voices/axford/docs/schmidd.pdf (“Research over the past several years indicate [sic] 
significant potential for restorative justice programs to reduce recidivism.”). The reduction of 
recidivism benefits everyone involved in, or affected by, the commission of crime. Victims 
benefit by having the peace of knowing the offender will not come after them again. By the 
same token, communities can also have peace in knowing that another criminal on the street has 
become a contributing member of the community. Perhaps the party who benefits the most from 
reduced recidivism is the offender himself. Knowing that he can control his actions and 
exercising that control has the potential to give him more power than offending ever did: 
“[Restorative justice] involves offenders directly in deciding how to make amends for their 
crimes, rather than relegating them to being ‘the passive objects of punishment,’ thereby more 
effectively internalizing the costs and effects of their actions.” Lucas, supra note 9, at 1371–72. 
 14. Other criticisms leveled by “liberal, feminist, and critical race critics” are:  
[T]hat the informality of typical restorative justice programs can . . . reinforce pre-
existing subordinating relationships, insidiously enlarge the reach of the state, 
dangerously reduce the protection of the state, reproduce inequality of results, and 
obscure systematic contexts and causes for the offense. Rather than healing the victim 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part I of this Note explores the history and underlying principles 
of restorative justice. Part II will detail the various due process 
criticisms that have been leveled at restorative justice. Part III 
discusses New Zealand’s due process system and how it has been 
able to successfully implement restorative justice in conjunction with 
due process. Part IV analyzes due process concerns in the United 
States, and how restorative justice can coexist with the Constitution. 
Part V contends that the benefits of restorative justice justify the 
minimal effort required to implement it.  
II. THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
A. Restorative Beginnings 
The beginnings of restorative justice in the 1970s were humble. A 
small number of programs existed in the United States and Canada.15 
The first noted use of restorative justice in modern society occurred 
in Ontario in 1974.16 However, the history of restorative justice 
extends further back than its modern inception in the 1970s. The 
underlying principles of what is called restorative justice were 
present in early civilizations all over the globe.17 
 
as promised, restorative justice processes can pressure victims to forgive their 
attackers too easily, causing further victimization, including violence. 
Howarth, supra note 9, at 724 (footnotes omitted). 
 15. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 42. Zehr notes that at its advent in the United States and 
Canada, “the concept . . . of restorative justice emerged during the 1970s and ‘80s . . . with a 
practice that was then called the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP).” Id.; see 
also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural 
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1257–58 (1994) (detailing the beginning of restorative justice 
programs in the United States, such as the Minneapolis Restitution Center).  
 16. Brown, supra note 15, at 1257–58. The perceived birth of victim-offender mediation 
is detailed in a case that occurred in Kitchener, Ontario:  
[T]wo young men . . . vandalized the property of twenty-two people . . . . They pled 
guilty to twenty-two charges. The offenders did not pay restitution to the court clerk’s 
office, however. Instead, in an experiment jointly administered by the probation 
department’s volunteer program and the Mennonite Central Committee, the two young 
offenders met with each victim. . . . Within six months, the young men had fulfilled 
their restitution obligations in full. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 17. The Maori of New Zealand and the ancient Celtic traditions of Ireland are among 
some of the sources of early restorative justice theory. See Lucas, supra note 9, at 1370 n.30 
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(discussing the history of restorative justice in Maori and Celtic traditions). 
 Before Navajo courts took on a form similar to the American state and federal systems, 
disputes in the Navajo community followed a more restorative approach. See generally Tom 
Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts: A Navajo Jurist’s Perspective, in 
NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 29 (Marianne O. Nielsen & 
James W. Zion eds., 2005). Tso ascribes the utility of restorative practices to the way that the 
Navajos lived: “When people live in groups or communities, they develop rules or guidelines 
by which the affairs of the group may proceed in an orderly fashion and the peace and harmony 
of the group may be maintained.” Id. at 30. Oral history demonstrates that a system of 
leadership existed with one of the functions of the leaders being dispute resolution which 
followed from their roles as givers of advice: “The people chose the headmen from among 
those who possessed the necessary qualities. The headmen needed to be eloquent and 
persuasive, since they exerted power by persuasion rather than coercion. Teaching ethics and 
encouraging the people to live in peace and harmony were emphasized.” Id. The customary way 
to resolve conflicts arising from criminal acts was to go to the “headmen,” who would resolve 
matters in a way that would be considered family group conferencing today:  
[T]he headman would meet with the wrongdoer, his or her family, the victim, and the 
victim’s family to discuss how to handle the matter. The discussion usually involved 
two issues: how to compensate the victim or the victim’s family for the wrong and 
how to deal with the wrongdoer. The discussion continued until everyone was in 
agreement as to what should be done.  
Id. 
 The Navajo method of resolving conflict persisted until 1868, when the United States 
federal government began dictating the structure of the court system. Id. at 31. Although the 
Navajos “were able to build upon concepts that were already present in [their] culture” in 
implementing these changes, Tso regrets that the value of the Navajo method of solving 
disputes was overlooked until only recently:  
Anglo judicial systems now pay a great deal of attention to alternative forms of dispute 
resolution. Before 1868 the Navajos settled disputes by mediation. Today our 
peacemaker courts are studied by many people and governments. Anglo justice 
systems are now interested in compensating victims of crime and searching for ways 
other than imprisonment to deal with criminal offenders. Before 1868 the Navajos did 
this. . . . We could have taught the Anglos these things 150 years ago.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 The notion of ubuntu characterizes the historical relevance of restorative justice to South 
Africa. Ann Skelton & Cheryl Frank, Conferencing in South Africa: Returning to Our Future, 
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 103, 104 (Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell eds., 
2001). The African worldview “embodies ideas about the interconnectedness of people to each 
other, the importance of the family group over the individual, and the value of benevolence 
towards [sic] all others in the community.” Id. Under ubuntu, community problems are resolved 
with a focus on “‘reconciliation, restoration and harmony.’” Id. The African custom, still 
practiced in South African rural communities, proceeded by having elders “preside over the 
resolution of problems experienced by members of the community.” Id. Resolution was 
achieved by focusing on “problems rather than offences,” and the elders made decisions after 
hearing both sides of the issue. Id. Those decisions usually included an order of reparation to 
the victim. Id. It was the focus on resolving the problem and compensating victims that made 
these practices restorative in nature. Id. at 104–05. 
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B. Principles and Models of Restorative Justice  
The various forms taken by restorative justice provide insight into 
its specific principles. Zehr identifies three basic principles that guide 
restorative justice: “Crime is a violation of people and of 
interpersonal relationships. Violations create obligations. The central 
obligation is to put right the wrongs.”18 These very broad principles 
inform state governments and agencies, as well as private programs, 
in formulating restorative processes. They are usually encountered in 
a setting that includes the offender, the victim, and the community 
affected by the crime.19 
The oldest and most common practice20 of restorative justice is 
the victim-offender conference, often called victim-offender 
mediation.21 This process involves bringing the victim and the 
offender together to resolve their individual issues in reference to the 
crime committed.22 The process is ideally a healing one23 in which 
 
 18. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 19. Zehr expounds upon these principles by acknowledging that 
all people are “interconnected” and that crime “represents a wound in the community.” Id. at 
19–20. These principles are juxtaposed with assumed principles of criminal justice, which are 
“[c]rime is a violation of the law and the state. Violations create guilt. Justice requires the state 
to determine blame . . . and impose pain . . . .” Id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at 27. Zehr explains:  
The key stakeholders, of course, are the immediate victims and offenders. Members of 
the community may be directly affected and thus should also be considered immediate 
stakeholders. . . . Restorative justice has tended to focus on the micro-communities of 
place or relationships which are directly affected by an offense but are often neglected 
by “state justice.” 
Id. at 27–28. 
 20. Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic 
Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 673 (2005) (“Of all the 
restorative justice processes, victim-offender mediation (VOM) has been in operation the 
longest—over twenty years. It is the most utilized model in the United States, accounting for 
almost 400 programs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 21. Other names this process can take on include “victim-offender reconciliation, victim-
offender conferencing, victim-offender dialogue, victim-offender meeting, or community 
conferencing.” Id. The differences in titles can be accounted for by ideological differences as 
well as differences in how programs approach the process. Id. For instance, Zehr has taken 
issue with calling it “mediation,” while “reconciliation” has posed a problem for victims’ 
advocates because of the latent expectation that the victim must reconcile with the offender; 
whereas calling it “conferencing” has posed a problem in trying to get it to be covered by 
confidentiality statutes governing mediation. Mary Ellen Reimund, Confidentiality in Victim 
Offender Mediation: A False Promise?, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 401, 405. 
 22. Zehr discusses this process further: “Upon referral, victims and offenders are worked 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/11
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the victims have the “opportunity to meet offenders, discuss how the 
crime has impacted their lives, discuss the physical, emotional, and 
financial impact of the crime, and receive answers to lingering 
questions about the crime and the offender.”24 The offender’s part in 
the process is one of being able to “explain what happened, take 
responsibility for his behavior, and make amends to both the victim 
and the community.”25 It is important that both parties agree to 
participate in the process, for it cannot proceed successfully without 
consent from the key people involved.26 
Another often used restorative practice is family group 
conferencing. This practice “enlarge[s] the circle of primary 
participants to include family members or other individuals 
significant to the parties directly involved.”27 According to Mary 
Ellen Reimund, family group conferencing is mainly used in cases of 
juvenile offenses.28 There are two basic forms: a scripted approach 
that utilizes specially trained facilitators like police officers, and an 
approach that is directed by a paid social service coordinator.29 In 
family group conferences it is important to expand the community 
involved to include family members because of the influential role 
that family members play.30 As in victim-offender mediation, the 
facilitator plays a neutral role in helping all the parties involved come 
up with a solution31; however, family group conferences go further 
than victim-offender mediation in that they move beyond the offense 
 
with individually. Then, upon their agreement to proceed, they are brought together in a 
meeting or conference. The meeting is put together and led by a trained facilitator who guides 
the process in a balanced manner.” ZEHR, supra note 3, at 47. 
 23. Zehr has identified three distinct goals of restorative process: alternative or 
diversionary, healing or therapeutic, and transitional. Id. at 52–54. 
 24. Reimund, supra note 20, at 674 (quotations omitted). 
 25. Id. 
 26. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 46. 
 27. Id. at 47–48. 
 28. Reimund, supra note 20, at 677 (“The vast majority of [family group conferencing] 
programs are limited to juvenile offenders.”). 
 29. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 48–49. The older model is the one more commonly utilized in 
New Zealand. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 49 (“Like the mediator in a [victim-offender mediation], the coordinator of a 
[family group conference] must seek to be impartial, balancing the concerns and interests of 
both sides.”). 
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itself.32 The plan that results from the family group conferences 
requires input from everyone in the conference, and “[t]he victim, the 
offender, or the police can each block an outcome if one of them is 
unsatisfied.”33 Family group conferences expand upon the principles 
of restorative justice by including the family as representatives of the 
community affected by the crime. 
A third manifestation of restorative justice is the circle approach.34 
Circles expand the list of involved participants even further than 
family group conferencing. In this program, in addition to the victim, 
offender, and families of the victims, other community members take 
part in the restorative process.35 There is still a facilitator involved, 
but “discussions within the circle are often more wide-ranging than in 
other restorative justice models.”36 Circle sentencing is in place in 
many communities, and Reimund argues that it is the “most 
restorative process available because it encompasses more of the 
restorative justice values than other processes.”37 
 
 32. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 50. As Zehr explains, the family group conference is an 
integrated process:  
Family group conferences . . . are not designed simply to allow for the expression of 
facts and feelings and to develop restitution agreements. Because they normally take 
the place of a court, they are charged with developing the entire plan for the offender 
that, in addition to reparations, includes elements of prevention and sometimes 
punishment. 
Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. “Sentencing circles” are one kind of circle. Id. Other types of circles include 
“healing” circles, “workplace conflict” circles, and “community dialogue” circles. Id. Zehr 
describes the circle process as follows: “participants arrange themselves in a circle. They pass a 
‘talking piece’ around the circle to assure that each person speaks, one at a time, in the order in 
which each is seated in the circle.” Id. at 51. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. The author goes on: “Participants may address situations in the community that are 
giving rise to the offense, the support needs of victims and offenders, the obligations that the 
community might have, community norms, or other related community issues.” Id. 
 37. Reimund, supra note 20, at 679. In support of her assertion that circles are the most 
restorative of all the restorative justice methods, Reimund discusses the “direct involvement” 
community members have “in determining which cases come to the circle.” Id. 
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III. POSSIBLE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
In several ways the Constitution seeks to make sure that citizens’ 
due process rights are not violated when they are accused of a crime. 
The Fifth Amendment38 provides that no person shall “be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”39 In addition to this prohibition, which was extended to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment,40 persons accused of crimes are 
afforded (by the Sixth Amendment41) the right to representation by 
counsel, and the right to a trial by jury.42 In the current criminal 
justice system these rights are protected at every phase.43 However, in 
a system that has not been refined, like restorative justice, this 
protection is less distinct. 
A. Self-Incrimination 
Restorative justice critics take issue with the way that restorative 
justice handles, or fails to handle, due process safeguards.44 Because 
 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 39. Id. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. § 1. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 42. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. 
 43. “In a coercive procedure, all legal guarantees must be observed. In a traditional 
criminal justice procedure, safeguards like legality, due process, and proportionality are 
evident.” Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 543, 560 (2004). 
 44. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1288 (discussing the due process shortcomings of 
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restorative justice emphasizes acknowledgment of personal 
responsibility in the crime committed, it is inevitable that an 
admission of guilt will take place.45 What is problematic about the 
acknowledgment of responsibility is its propensity to violate the due 
process right against self-incrimination.46 In a post-adjudicatory stage 
this is not as problematic because the offender has already been 
found guilty. However, in the steps that occur prior to adjudication 
the need to address self-incrimination safeguards is greater.  
Because there is always a chance that the restorative process may 
break down and that the offender will have to take a chance with the 
criminal justice system, what is said in the restorative justice process 
has the potential to be used against the offender in a later criminal 
proceeding. Self-incrimination is also problematic when offenders 
discuss unrelated crimes they have committed.47 Even if the offense 
at issue is resolved in the restorative process, there is still the problem 
that statements made in the proceedings could be used against the 
offender in prosecutions for other crimes. 
 
restorative justice); see also Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic 
Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (2000) (“[B]ecause VOM pressures 
offenders to accept informal resolution of the charges against them and to waive representation 
by a lawyer, trial by jury, and the right to appeal, it would seem to stand on constitutionally 
questionable ground.”). 
 45. Brown, supra note 15, at 1290; see Reimund, supra note 20, at 685 (“The 
constitutional rights of a person accused of a crime and directed into a restorative process could 
be violated if she was not given any warning about rights against self-incrimination and then 
revealed information which later could be used against her in court.”). 
 46. Self-incrimination is just one of several problematic issues associated with admitting 
guilt. See Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 69. The authors identify the source of 
self-incrimination problems: 
[Literature in the restorative justice field that identifies a “victim” and “offender”] thus 
has excluded from the potential scope of restorative justice at least three categories of 
criminal defendants: (1) clearly innocent defendants who still need healing from the 
harm caused by accusation, arrest, incarceration and pretrial court procedures; (2) 
defendants whose legal guilt may be uncertain or unprovable [sic] and who may 
nonetheless recognize that their own bad decisions contributed to the situation leading 
to arrest; and (3) defendants who are prosecuted not in response to a complaint by an 
individual victim but rather by a regulatory state . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 47. Reimund, supra note 20, at 686 (“[T]here have been instances where the offender has 
admitted committing crimes outside of the offense at issue during the restorative process. As a 
consequence, such information could potentially be used against the person in a subsequent 
prosecution.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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B. Right to Counsel 
Restorative justice, be it pre-adjudication or post-adjudication, 
also poses a problem for the right to counsel. Critics have 
acknowledged that restorative justice often leaves lawyers out and 
diminishes their role in the process.48 Defense attorneys often see 
their role in advocating for clients as one of avoiding, or at least 
limiting, punishment.49 The primary advice they give to clients is to 
deny guilt if possible.50 However, this is difficult to achieve in 
restorative justice systems when the objective is for the offender to 
acknowledge responsibility.  
The traditional role defense attorneys take can be an impediment 
to the restorative justice process.51 They seem to discourage the very 
focus of restorative justice. Restorative programs exist that allow 
attorneys to be present, but their presence is usually not mandatory.52 
There are also programs in which attorneys are not present at all.53 
Essentially, an offender involved in restorative justice may be unable 
to receive the same kind of assistance of counsel that he would have 
received in the traditional criminal justice system.  
C. Right to Trial  
Another detriment to due process rights that has been identified by 
critics regarding restorative justice is that it seems to circumvent the 
 
 48. See, e.g., Blackwell & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 69 (“The apparent requirement 
that a defendant be found an ‘offender,’ either through confession or adjudication, also tends to 
exclude (or at least alienate) a key player in the criminal justice system, the defense attorney.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. (“[T]he defense lawyer is understandably reluctant for his or [her] client to 
enter into an encounter that requires admission of guilt without knowing in advance the likely 
sentencing consequences . . . .”). 
 51. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1289 (“Indeed, some programs actively discourage 
counsel from attending because their focus on ‘rights’ is thought to obstruct the mediation 
process.”). 
 52. Telephone Interview with Shar Brinkley, Coordinator, Madison County Cmty. Justice, 
in Madison County, Ind. (July 28, 2005) (discussing the fact that the Madison City Community 
Justice Center gives offenders the “opportunity” to have a lawyer present). 
 53. Telephone Interview with Davi Mozie, Program Coordinator, Del. Ctr. for Justice, 
Adult Offender Servs., in Wilmington, Del. (July 28, 2005) (discussing fact that attorneys are 
not present at victim-offender mediations). 
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right to trial.54 This becomes more of an issue either when the 
offender is not prepared to plead guilty, or when the offender is 
compelled to participate in a restorative justice program.55 The 
procedural safeguards afforded by a formal court process, such as the 
rules of evidence, are rarely a part of restorative justice mediations 
and conferences.56 A mandatory process, such as the reparative 
boards employed in Vermont,57 provokes critics of restorative justice 
to regard it as a grave threat to due process58 because the defendant 
 
 54. See infra notes 55–61. 
 55. See Reimund, supra note 20, at 683–84. The author notes that, when “guilt is in 
dispute,” the “full array of procedural protections afforded by formal court processes are 
desired . . . .” Id. She also discusses the importance of voluntary participation to the American 
Bar Association concerning VOM, because “[i]f an offender is compelled to participate in 
restorative processes, the concerns about due process are greater.” Id. at 684. When the 
coercion occurs pre-adjudication, due process problems are at their highest. If the defendant 
pleads guilty, “the question becomes whether due process was infringed upon in any greater 
degree in a restorative process than through plea bargaining.” Id.  
 56. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1288. Brown asserts: 
Public processes can protect offenders through various safeguards: the right to counsel, 
judicial review to ensure offenders are informed and act voluntarily, rules of evidence 
that exclude irrelevant information from proceedings to determine guilt and 
punishment, and uniform sentencing schemes to make sure that punishment is 
reasonably related to the crime committed rather than being based upon the individual 
who committed it. Because victim-offender mediation stresses substantive outcomes 
rather than procedural regularity, it cannot protect offenders from unfairly subjective 
assessments of their culpability or from well-intentioned but unrestrained exercise of 
discretion by program administrators. 
Id. 
 57. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 910 (Supp. 2006). The Vermont statute establishes, as a 
condition of probation, a restorative justice program that utilizes community reparative boards. 
The boards consist of members of the community that have been recommended by “nonprofit 
organizations or municipal entities.” Id. § 910(a). In addition to being responsible for the 
implementation of restorative justice programs, which determine how offenders will make 
reparation for their offenses, reparative boards are directed to “[e]ducate the public about, and 
promote community support for, the restorative justice program.” Id. § 910a(d)(2). For the 
history and underlying principles behind these enabling statutes, see Jan Peter Dembinski, 
Restorative Justice: Vermont State Policy, 29 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 39 (2004), available at 
http://www.vtbar.org/ezstatic/data/vtbar/journal/dec_2003/RestorativeJustice.pdf.  
 Vermont’s Community Justice Centers, which oversee such restorative justice programs as 
the reparative panels, are funded by the Department of Corrections. Jan Peter Dembinski, 
Restorative Justice in Vermont: Part Two, 30 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 49, 50 (2004). Group 
conferencing can be used in cases involving “burglaries, simple assaults, neighbor disputes, and 
incidents of vandalism.” Id. at 52. For a more in-depth explanation of Vermont’s restorative 
justice system, see Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles in 
Restorative Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 57, 67. 
 58. Telephone Interview with David C. Sleigh, Partner, Sleigh & Williams, in St. 
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may not receive adequate notice or be given the chance to make an 
informed decision.59  
Even though the due process issues are lessened in a voluntary 
restorative justice process (when the offender willingly pleads guilty 
of his own accord), some critics have questioned just how voluntary 
such a process really is.60 The underlying theory is that offering 
restorative justice as an alternative to incarceration is a gentler form 
of compulsion when the defendant feels as if his fate will be worse if 
he does not opt for the restorative route and it violates due process by 
its very nature of only appearing voluntary.61 
 
Johnsbury, Vt. (June 8, 2005). Sleigh identifies as the problem with the mandatory reparative 
boards the lack of appealability and limits of the boards’ rulings, which give them a broader 
power than a judge. Id. However, Vermont has recently implemented a pretrial diversion 
restorative justice program that affords offenders the opportunity to make a choice between 
going to court and participating in a restorative justice program. Id. Sleigh finds this system 
unproblematic because participation does not appear on the offender’s criminal record and 
offenders retain the ability to “bargain” for their sentence. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1264. Brown details the coercive nature of restorative 
justice programs: 
Programs that conduct mediation early in the criminal process, when the offender still 
lacks information about the likely outcome of the case, can more effectively exploit 
the offender’s fear of state punishment in order to secure the offender’s cooperation. A 
VOM program appears to lack some of the state’s coercive power, because the 
offender can refuse to mediate. But the offender’s freedom to reject mediation can be 
constrained if the offender fears indirect punishment for the refusal to mediate (this 
could occur if the offender’s failure to cooperate in mediation is taken into account at 
the time of sentencing). Even if the VOM program does not actively exercise coercive 
power, it can exploit the offender’s fear of state coercion by scheduling mediation at a 
time when the offender’s uncertainty is greatest. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative 
Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 78 (1998) (“An innocent person, or a person with legal 
defenses, may admit responsibility and accept diversion in order to avoid the uncertainty of a 
trial. While this is not overt coercion, it raises due process concerns because it circumvents a 
legal procedure that might have resulted in acquittal.”); Kate Warner, Family Group 
Conferences and the Rights of the Offender, in FAMILY CONFERENCING AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
THE WAY FORWARD OR MISPLACED OPTIMISM? 141, 142 (Christine Alder & Joy Wundersitz 
eds., 1994), available at http://www.restorativejustice.org/articlesdb/articles/20 (“When 
admission of an offence is a prerequisite to participation in a diversionary program, there is 
inevitably an inducement to admit responsibility to avoid the uncertainty of a court outcome 
and to dispose of the matter as quickly as possible.”).  
 61. Even advocates for restorative justice recognize the coercive possibilities of 
restorative justice: 
[I]n reality there will be a certain level of coercion in most restorative processes, 
because the looming alternative (and predecessor) will usually be the traditional 
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D. Double Jeopardy 
Restorative justice is also problematic for critics because it 
potentially violates offenders’ rights against double jeopardy.62 The 
potential for this violation has been identified when there is a chance 
that the restorative justice proceedings are not successful, and 
therefore the case proceeds to trial.63 One could argue that offenders 
who end up having to participate in both processes receive double the 
punishment for one offense.  
E. Confidentiality 
Adding to the due process problems posed by restorative justice 
programs is the uncertainty of confidentiality. Restorative justice 
scholars acknowledge that an assurance of confidentiality in 
proceedings would do more to guard against self-incrimination and 
 
criminal justice system. It is coercion of the offender by the police that lands her in the 
criminal justice system, and thus in a restorative justice process such as victim-
offender mediation, and it is a much higher level of coercion that probably awaits her 
as a default if she does not successfully complete such a program. A lesser level of 
coercion to successfully complete the program exists for the victim if he wishes to play 
a leading role in the outcome of the process.  
Christa Obold-Eshleman, Note, Victims’ Rights and the Danger of Domestication of the 
Restorative Justice Paradigm, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 571, 599 (2004). 
The trouble with coercion is also questioned: “Is any level of coercion problematic for a 
restorative justice rights model to be based on integrative power? Not necessarily, because 
outside pressures can sometimes work towards [sic] positive internal goals.” Id. 
 62. See generally Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views of Fifth 
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause Pertinent to or Applied in Federal Criminal Cases, 50 
L. Ed. 2d 830 (1978) (explaining the ramifications of the due process clause). Schopler writes: 
While the Supreme Court has recognized that the double jeopardy clause is written in 
terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction and not in terms of peril of second 
punishment, the court has also declared that the purpose of the clause is to prohibit 
multiple punishment or repeated prosecutions for the same offense. The rationale 
underlying the clause, expressed by the court in varying language, is that the state with 
all its resources should not be allowed to subject a defendant to embarrassment, 
expense, and ordeal by repeated attempts to convict him for an alleged offense. 
Id. at 836 (footnotes omitted). 
 63. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic 
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 103 (1999) (discussing critics’ concerns about restorative 
justice constituting double jeopardy “when consensus cannot be reached at a conference and the 
matter therefore goes to court”). 
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double jeopardy.64 However, that assurance cannot always be given 
or guaranteed.65 Therefore, scholars decry the lack of statutory 
guarantees of confidentiality in restorative justice programs.66  
Mediation itself suffers from a lack of uniform mediation 
confidentiality statutes;67 even when a statute exists, there is no 
consensus as to whether restorative justice can be classified as 
mediation.68 In conventional mediation, the mediator requests that all 
parties agree to keep the content of their discussion confidential, 
sometimes even securing written confidentiality agreements.69 
However, such a confidentiality agreement within the victim-offender 
mediation setting could not block a subpoena when a statute does not 
afford protection. Without statutory guarantees the statements made 
in a restorative justice program could be used against the offender in 
court.70 
 
 64. See Reimund, supra note 21, at 406 (discussing the lack of constitutional guarantees 
in victim-offender mediation). 
 65. See id. at 406. (“Of even greater concern in mediating criminal cases, is the risk an 
offender takes if confidentiality cannot be guaranteed and whether the defense bar will buy into 
restorative processes with that issue unsettled.”). 
 66. See Brown, supra note 15, at 1288 (“The confidentiality of mediation generally is a 
controversial issue, and absent a clear statutory privilege protecting the mediation, considerable 
information about it may become available to people and institutions outside the mediation.”). 
See generally Reimund, supra note 21, at 401 (discussing confidentiality in mediation). 
 67. See generally Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Framework 
for Self-Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 251 (2002) (discussing the variety of state 
statutes governing confidentiality in mediation and Congress’s efforts to encourage uniformity 
in the wording and governance of these statutes). 
 68. See Reimund, supra note 21, at 406 (“Since most confidentiality statutes do not 
specifically include VOM, a determination of whether they would receive protection under 
[mediation confidentiality statutes] could turn on the terminology used to describe the 
program.”). 
 69. Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege’s Transition from Theory to Implementation: 
Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process, and 
the Public Interest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 10. 
 70. See Reimund, supra note 21, at 401. Reimund questions whether promises of 
confidentiality at the beginning of a victim-offender mediation could prove to be “false 
promises” when “the mediator receives a subpoena from the county prosecutor requiring her 
testimony in a criminal trial where the offender from her mediation has been charged” with 
other crimes. Id. at 401–02. Reimund is also concerned that an offender’s due process rights are 
in danger by the lack of confidentiality when faced with an offender’s prior crimes: 
Because a victim offender meeting process encourages offenders to openly discuss 
their version [sic] of the criminal offense being mediated, admissions of prior 
wrongdoing beyond the current crime may be revealed as part of the story telling or as 
a result of the offender’s desire to “come clean.” Once the offender discloses that 
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IV. INTEGRATION OF RESTORATIVE PRINCIPLES AND DUE PROCESS 
PRINCIPLES IN NEW ZEALAND 
A. Restorative Justice Processes in New Zealand 
The implementation of restorative justice in New Zealand is so 
extensive that its practices often serve as a model for implementation 
in other countries.71 Its success rate is known by restorative justice 
proponents throughout the world.72 Because New Zealand’s approach 
has been geared mostly toward juvenile offenders, the guidelines for 
a fair and efficient process are governed by the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”).73  
The restorative justice practice of choice in New Zealand is the 
family group conference.74 The 1989 Act ensures good faith 
participation by all parties in the family group conferences by 
“requir[ing] that written records of the decisions, recommendations 
and plans of family group conferences be prepared and collected.”75 
The actual process of the family group conference is pretty 
 
information, what is the obligation of the mediator to report it? . . . There are two 
potential conflicts presented in the prior crimes debate. One deals with the obligation 
of the mediator to proactively disclose the information in the instant case, and the other 
has to do with the mediation communications being sought for subsequent 
prosecution . . . . 
Id. at 407 (footnotes omitted). In the area of future crimes, Reimund asserts that confidentiality 
can cause conflict with any duty to warn that may exist in the event of a serious threat of death 
or injury, and then calls for a distinction as to whether all crimes should be considered the 
same: “Should warnings and non-confidential status attach to imminent threats of serious crime 
or death only with less serious property crimes still being protected?” Id. at 408. 
 71. “New Zealand is . . . often represented as the ‘beacon’ country with the most far-
reaching restorative justice system for juveniles.” Walgrave, supra note 43, at 566; see 
Reimund, supra note 20, at 676–77 (“In 1989, New Zealand became the first country to adopt a 
fully restorative juvenile justice system using [family group conferencing] . . . . A second model 
of [family group conferencing] is used in Australia, but it is based on ideas borrowed from the 
New Zealand model.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 72. SCHMID, supra note 13, at 3. Schmid notes that New Zealand’s processes have 
received “international acclaim” that established New Zealand as a “pioneering model of 
restorative justice.” Id. 
 73. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, 1989 S.N.Z. No. 24. The 
origin of this act, interestingly enough, stems from “a growing concern that removal of children 
from their families was destabilizing and otherwise harmful.” SCHMID, supra note 13, at 11. 
 74. ZEHR, supra note 3, at 48. 
 75. Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 60, at 64. The act mandates that these records be kept 
at the “district office closest to the location of the conference.” Id. at 66. 
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straightforward: it involves a youth justice coordinator, the police, 
and, of course, the victim and offender.76 One aspect of the family 
group conference in New Zealand that is beneficial is that valuable 
information is obtained about the offender and his reasons for 
committing the offense.77 
New Zealand’s juvenile offenders are not the only offenders that 
can take advantage of restorative justice. In the mid-1990s, pilot 
diversion programs for adults began operating.78 As of 2000, New 
Zealand has been using family group conferences with adults.79 For 
example, in Waitakere two groups joined to begin a pilot program for 
adults that extends the benefits of the youth program to adults.80 
Referrals to the program can be suggested by anyone involved in a 
criminal case.81 Following approval by the court,82 the administrator 
 
 76. The process begins when “a youth justice coordinator invites the victim of the 
criminal offense to meet with the offender and the offender’s family.” SCHMID, supra note 13, 
at 13. After a statement of the facts has been read by the police and admitted or denied by the 
offender, “the victim is asked to speak about the impact the offense has had on him/her.” Id. 
Following the victim’s statement, which could be given in person or by letter, “[t]he conference 
participants then discuss collectively . . . what should be done to repair the harm to the victim 
. . . and what the offender should do in order to be held accountable for the offense.” Id. The 
offender then meets with his family “to discuss a suitable plan,” and the group comes back 
together to negotiate the plan. Id. Once an agreement is reached, the justice coordinator records 
it in writing. Id. The plan will be presented to the court for approval if “criminal charges ha[ve] 
been presented in court.” Id. 
 77. “Family group conferences in New Zealand, for example, have provided a greater 
understanding regarding why and how youth crime is committed.” Id. at 37. The underlying 
factors that may be influencing young repeat offenders include cultural isolation or the 
experience of major trauma. Id. at 38. Institutions of the community play integral roles in this 
information-gathering process: “Using this information and a problem-solving or ‘broken 
windows’ approach, the youth aid police and the youth justice coordinator in Wellington 
worked with local schools and community groups to address several key causes and factors 
involved in the worst and most troublesome youth offending in Wellington.” Id. 
 78. Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, Restorative Justice in New Zealand, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 
257, 259 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003). 
 79. SCHMID, supra note 13, at 17. 
 80. Id. at 16. The Restorative Justice Trust, established in 1999, and the Methodist 
Mission Northern together established a pilot program using cases referred from the Waitakere 
District Court. Id. 
 81. Id. at 16–17. 
 82. There are four criteria for making a referral, and the court can approve or disapprove. 
Id. at 17. These criteria are: “there was a direct victim[,] the offense had a maximum sentence 
of at least two years imprisonment[,] the offender had admitted guilt[, and] there was essential 
agreement about the facts underlying the case.” Id. These criteria are also satisfied in the youth 
family group conference programs. Id. at 13. 
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of the program appoints a facilitator whose job it is to contact the 
victim and offender, convene a conference between them and their 
supporters (including lawyers), and write a report to the court.83 The 
report is non-binding, but the court may consider it when deciding the 
disposition of the case and imposing sentence.84 This scheme 
“differ[s] from family group conferences in that restorative justice 
conferences are voluntary and only take place if both the victim and 
offender agree to participate.”85 Another difference between this 
program and voluntary programs is that because judges have 
discretion in allowing the reports from the conferences to have a 
bearing on the sentence the adult form is “less likely to have a 
profound impact on the eventual sentence and [is] more centrally and 
specifically victim focused.”86 
In addition to family group conferences, adult diversion programs 
employ community-oriented conferences. In Project Turnaround,87 
one of the pilot programs funded by the New Zealand Crime 
Prevention Unit, judges divert certain offenders to these programs 
upon their first appearance in court.88 The characteristic “panel 
meeting” of Project Turnaround is modeled after the family group 
conference, but representatives of the community are also present.89 
Attendance by the offender at these panel meetings presents the 
 
 83. Id. at 17. 
 84. Id. Three more schemes like this one are in existence in Auckland, Hamilton, and 
Dunedin. Morris & Maxwell, supra note 78, at 261. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. For a description of Project Turnaround, see id. at 259–60. Te Whanau Awhina, a 
pilot program begun at the same time, operates in the same way as Project Turnaround in that 
the judge refers the case during a court hearing. Id. at 260. However, it is different in that the 
offenders referred to it are Maori, whereas the offenders in Project Turnaround are mostly of 
European origin. Id. In Te Whanau Awhina, the direct victims and the police do not attend. Id. 
Because the victims are rarely involved, the authors do not consider Te Whanau Awhina to be 
“fully consistent with restorative processes.” Id. Like Project Turnaround, there are community 
representatives and a discussion of the offense and its repercussions, as well as a focus on 
reintegrating the offender into the community and finding him employment. Id. However, 
unlike Project Turnaround, the case is “not necessarily diverted from further court appearances 
and sanctions.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 259. 
 89. SCHMID, supra note 13, at 18. The process operates in a similar way to the family 
group conference, featuring a discussion between the offender and the victim of the crime and 
why it was committed, followed by suggestions for dealing with the offense and a signed 
contract detailing the plan for resolving the issue. Id. 
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possibility that the offender will not have to appear in court anymore, 
and will have all evidence against him withdrawn.90 
Another program for adult offenders employed in New Zealand is 
the Community Accountability Programme.91 This program involves 
the victims and offenders in a way that is different from the previous 
programs. Instead of panel members, paid facilitators help victims 
and offenders make decisions about how to resolve their issues.92 In 
the late 1990s, the Crime Prevention Unit funded the creation of more 
diversion programs utilizing community panels modeled after the 
first pilot programs.93 “By July 2000, there were, in total, [ten] 
program[s] supported and administered by the Crime Prevention 
Unit.”94 
B. Due Process in New Zealand  
New Zealand has no formal written constitution to mirror that of 
the United States Constitution, but New Zealanders have, through 
statutory and common law, the same rights afforded to United States 
citizens through the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. New Zealanders 
are entitled to representation by counsel,95 trial by jury,96 the right 
against self-incrimination,97 and the right against double jeopardy.98 
 
 90. Morris & Maxwell, supra note 78, at 259. The authors go on to state that this process 
is not a fully restorative one “where decisions are made by those who are most directly affected 
by the offending rather than by appointed representatives of the community.” Id. However, 
since “the plans decided at the meetings involve[] making amends to the victim and the 
community,” Project Turnaround “is consistent with a restorative justice approach.” Id. at 259–
60. 
 91. Id. at 260–61. This program ended during its first year, but has since resumed 
operation. Id. at 261. 
 92. Id. at 260. The authors determined that, because of the greater control given to the 
victim and offender, this program was the most restorative of the three. Id. 
 93. Id. at 261. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Compare Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, § 23(1) (“Everyone who is 
arrested or who is detained under any enactment . . . [s]hall have the right to consult and instruct 
a lawyer without delay and to be informed of that right . . . .”), and id. § 24(c) (denoting the 
same rights), with U.S. CONST. amend. V, and U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 96. Compare Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 24 (“Everyone who is charged with an offence 
. . . [s]hall have the right . . . to the benefit of a trial by jury when the penalty for the offence is 
or includes imprisonment for more than 3 months . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 97. Compare Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 25 (“Everyone who is charged with an offence 
has, in relation to the determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: . . . [t]he right 
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Because these rights exist, the same due process concerns faced by 
United States offenders would be faced by New Zealand offenders; 
thus, the New Zealand model is all the more applicable to the United 
States. 
New Zealand is able to preserve these rights and make restorative 
justice such an integral part of its justice system relatively easily. For 
instance, in the adult pilot programs, offenders first have to agree to 
the process.99 This practice preserves the offender’s right to trial 
because the offender is able to choose whether to go to trial or to 
participate in restorative justice. 
Project Turnaround is exemplary in the way it presents the 
opportunity for the offender to have all charges against him dropped 
and all evidence withdrawn.100 Although the offender must admit 
guilt in order to participate in this program,101 his rights against self-
incrimination are not compromised in the traditional sense. Because 
of the opportunity presented by successful participation in the 
program, admitting guilt in a restorative justice setting does not have 
the same legal repercussions that it has in a retributive setting. In 
essence, by admitting guilt and choosing to participate, the offender 
is not really “incriminating” himself because he comes out of the 
process with a clean legal slate. 
In the event that the conference is unsuccessful, the Waitakere 
program serves as a model that preserves the right against self-
incrimination. The report that results from the conference is not 
binding,102 so while the judge may consider it, she does not have to 
abide by it. As such, any admission of guilt in the restorative process 
would not automatically be detrimental to the offender’s case in 
court.103 
 
not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 98. Compare Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 26(2) (“No one who has been finally acquitted or 
convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again.”), with U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 82. 
 102. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 103. Even if the judge did opt to use the report from the restorative process, its only 
applicability would be at the sentencing phase of the adjudication. Presumably, the court would 
have already had to find the offender guilty before the restorative process report would even 
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The programs employed in New Zealand also exhibit a profound 
respect for the right to counsel.104 Although it is not mandatory that 
the offender have an attorney present, the offender’s choice to 
employ one is manifest.105  
Project Turnaround is also a good model for the preservation of 
double jeopardy rights. Because a successful process usually results 
in withdrawn evidence and dropped charges,106 the offender does not 
face the prospect of paying consequences under the retributive 
system as well as the restorative one. Thus, voluntary processes also 
help protect the offender against double jeopardy. 
V. NEW ZEALAND AS A MODEL FOR INTEGRATION OF RESTORATIVE 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN THE UNITED STATES 
If the United States were to follow New Zealand’s example it 
would not be difficult to integrate restorative justice into the current 
criminal justice system while preserving offenders’ due process 
rights. As New Zealand demonstrates, restorative justice can be 
implemented on a wide scale without numerous due process 
violations. The similarity of New Zealand’s due process requirements 
to those of the United States makes New Zealand the ideal starting 
point for examining how the United States can succeed with 
restorative justice.107 
First, participation in a restorative justice process must be 
voluntary. In order for the choice to be truly voluntary, the offender 
needs to be informed of all of the options and possible repercussions 
involved with each choice.108 Such a decision would be an excellent 
opportunity for attorney participation. Although restorative justice 
processes typically do not purposefully exclude attorneys from the 
process, giving the attorney an actual role as an advisor about which 
 
come into play, thus eliminating any concern that an admission during the restorative 
conference would detrimentally affect the court’s determination of guilt. 
 104. See SCHMID, supra note 13, at 17. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 108. This would resolve the issue of proper notice, as well as eliminate any subtle 
compulsion. If the offender is able to weigh his options with every possible bit of information 
on the table, he is more likely to make a decision that is in his best interest. 
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route would be most beneficial to the offender would solidify the 
attorney’s usefulness to the process.109 Inviting offenders to consult 
with their attorneys before agreeing to participate in the process 
would effectively preserve the right to counsel. 
The attorney’s role would not have to end there, however. Once 
the offender decides to pursue restorative justice, the attorney could 
also ensure that due process safeguards are assured. 
Having a system in place that would effectively drop all charges 
in the event of a successful restorative conference would further 
preserve offenders’ due process rights by ensuring offenders are not 
subjected to double jeopardy. Although critics may return to the 
argument that this is subtle coercion that limits the offender’s access 
to trial,110 it is important to note the emphasis on a “successful” 
conference. It would seem that in order for the conference to be 
successful, both the offender and the victim would be committed to 
making the desired outcome a reality. If an offender feels coerced 
into taking part in the conference, he is then less likely to be 
committed to it, and a successful conference is then an unlikely 
result. 
In the event that the conference is unsuccessful, confidentiality 
safeguards are necessary.111 In fact, without confidentiality 
safeguards, restorative justice will not stand against due process 
challenges. A uniform act should be drafted to address these 
challenges. Specifically, establishing a privilege for statements made 
in the course of a restorative conference not only preserves offenders’ 
rights against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, but will allow 
the offender to be more open in his communications.  
 
 109. In advising her client about the pros and cons of participating in a restorative 
conference versus taking his chances at trial, the attorney could still be a zealous advocate for 
the offender. In fact, advising in such a situation may be an even better manifestation of her 
duty to her client, because she would be evaluating what is best for her client, rather than just 
what is necessary to keep her client out of prison. 
 110.  See supra Part III.C. 
 111.  See supra Part III.E. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If the American justice system measures its success by the 
population of its prisons, then it is a successful system indeed.112 
However, if the success of a system should be measured by a 
reduction in crime and an increase in feelings of security, then the 
system as it stands can be improved. 
Restorative justice has been shown to provide the kind of 
improvements that the current retributive justice system needs.113 
Understandably, there can be reluctance to overhaul the only familiar 
system in favor of one that has not yet proven itself on a wide scale in 
this country. Further, when the potential threat to fundamental rights 
of due process is added to the equation, the likelihood of 
implementing the new system is further decreased. 
Restorative justice does not aim to reduce due process rights or 
overhaul well-functioning justice systems. Integrating it into the 
American justice system would not necessitate a revamping of the 
Constitution. Indeed, its implementation is already taking place on 
American soil.114 New Zealand, which incorporates similar due 
process rights through statutory law, has been able to successfully 
implement restorative justice in such a way that the country now 
serves as a model for other countries seeking to make their criminal 
justice systems more effective. 
New Zealand’s example would satisfy criticism that deems 
restorative justice too risky of a system for widespread 
implementation in the United States. In addition, restorative justice 
need not completely replace retributive justice, and can even have 
some retributive aspects. It would take time and resources to make 
restorative justice more than an enigma to the American public, but 
some time spent rethinking and reforming the way crimes are handled 
in this country is a small price to pay for the probable increase in 
public feelings of security, and in the number of contributing 
members of society. 
 
 112. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: THIRTY-THREE 
CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF GROWTH, http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/ 
publications/inc_newfigures.pdf. 
 113. See supra Part IV. 
 114.  See, e.g., supra note 4. 
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